A Quick Refutation of The Moral Perfectionist Argument

The Moral Perfectionist Argument is one of the variations of the moral argument. It is presented as follows:

1. We ought to be morally perfect.
2. If we ought to be morally perfect, then we can be morally perfect.
3. We cannot be morally perfect unless God exists.
Therefore:
4. God exists.

The logic in this argument is sound, so a premise needs to be attacked.

Premise 1 assumes there is some form of objective morality. This premise can be rejected by simply denying it, there is no empirical evidence to suggest it besides our intuitions, which alone should not be used as an argument in complex philosophical or scientific discussion.

So already we see this isn't the best argument in the world.

I'll accept the second premise.

Even if we accept the first two premises, it doesn't show that Christianity is true, it shows it's false. Consider, Christianity claims that all are sinners by nature, we are literally born into sin. If that is true, then we cannot be morally perfect. Thus you don't "ought" to be morally perfect if you accept all of these, since the premise if you ought then you can is represented by p -> q, but since you negate q, you have to negate p. A formulation of this argument would be as follows:

1. If the Christian God exists, we ought to be morally perfect.
2. If we ought to be morally perfect, then we can be morally perfect.
3. Sinners cannot be morally perfect.
4. If the Christian God exists, then all people are sinners. (Otherwise, you could be saved without Christ.)
5. Therefore, if the Christian God exists, we cannot be morally perfect. (From 3 and 4)
6. Therefore, if the Christian God exists, we do not ought to be morally perfect. (From 5 and 2)
7. Therefore, the Christian God does not exist. (From the contradiction of 6 and 1)

So which premise are they planning on attacking? I feel that this is actually a decent reason for denial of the Christian God, since my rejection of the premise 1 of the original argument doesn't apply here.

For the last premise (of the original argument), like I said before, it tells us nothing about which God it is, besides being contradictory to Christian doctrine. I would actually assert that it, assuming the rejection of my previous criticism, is only sufficient to proving a perfect moral standard exists contingently in some possible world. You can accept that being "morally perfect" is equivalent to being like "being X", who exists in "World X". There is nothing wrong with asserting this, because it's really no different from asserting one that exists necessarily, in every possible world.